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Hanssler: "Stark" Raving Mad: Making the Self-Referral Disclosure Protocol

NOTE
"STARK" RAVING MAD: MAKING THE
SELF-REFERRAL DISCLOSURE PROTOCOL
BETTER, FASTER, STRONGER
I.

INTRODUCTION

"Stark Law" is the popular name for section 1877 of the Social
Security Act,' which prohibits physician self-referrals of Medicare
patients. Congress enacted the law in 1989 due to concern over the
increasing rate of Medicare patients referred for testing services at
facilities in which the referring physicians have an ownership interest.2
Stark Law is enforced, overseen, and regulated primarily by the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS").3 The vast majority of
Stark Law claims, however, are filed as qui tam suits by relators (private
persons) 4 pursuant to the False Claims Act ("FCA").' When a relator
brings a suit, the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") decides whether to
intervene or to let the relator proceed on his own.6 The harsh reality of a
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2012).
2. See About Stark Law, STARK L., http://starklaw.org/stark law.htm (last visited Apr. 10,
2017); Physician Self Referral, CMS.GOV, https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Fraud-and-Abuse/
PhysicianSelfReferral/index.html?redirect-/PhysicianSelfReferral (last visited Apr. 10, 2017).
3. Marc S. Raspanti & Sarah R. Lavelle, Who Is Enforcing the Stark Law of the United
States, AHLA CONNECTIONS, Sept. 2012, at 24, 25.
4. See Paula Tironi, The "Stark" Reality: Is the FederalPhysician Self-Referral Law Badfor
the Health Care Industry?, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 235, 239 (2010); Press Release, Office of Pub.
Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Recovers $3.8 Billion from False Claims Act
Cases in Fiscal Year 2013 (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-departmentrecovers-38-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2013.pdf. Qui tam comes from the Latin word
for "who as well," and refers to a lawsuit brought by a whistleblower "against a person or company
who is believed to have violated the law in the performance of a contract with the government." Qui
Tam Action, LAW.COM, http://dictionary.law.com/default.aspx?selected=1709 (last visited Apr. 10,
2017).
5. Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Recovers
Nearly $6 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2014 (Nov. 20, 2014),
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-nearly-6-billionfalseclaims-act-cases-fiscalyear-2014.
6. Jonathan T. Brollier, Note, Mutiny of the Bounty: A Moderate Change in the Incentive
Structure of Qui Tam Actions Brought Under the False Claims Act, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 693, 703
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Stark Law violation coupled with a colorable claim under the FCA can
clearly be seen in the case of Tuomey HealthcareSystem, Inc.' In July of
2015, Tuomey incurred civil monetary penalties levied in excess of $237
million as a result of a qui tam suit.' In his concurring opinion, Judge
James Wynn described the "troubling picture the case paints: An
impenetrably complex set of laws and regulations that will result in a
likely death sentence for a community hospital in an already medically
underserved area." 9
In the United States, "Medicare is the federal health insurance
program for people who are 65 or older, certain younger people with
disabilities, and people with End-Stage Renal Disease.""o In 2014, there
(2006). A false claim is made by "any person who knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a
false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval." 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (2012). The FCA
carries civil penalties ranging between $5000 to $10,000 per claim and three times (treble) the
amount of damages sustained by the government. Id. § 3729(a)(1)(G). CMS has not historically
sought enforcement of Stark Law, policing it themselves. PUB. INTEREST COMM., AM. HEALTH
LAWYERS Ass'N, A PUBLIC POLICY DISCUSSION: TAKING THE MEASURE OF THE STARK LAW 11,

https://www.healthlawyers.org/hlresources/Pl/ConvenerSessions/Documents/Stark%20White%20P
aper.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2017). Rather, it relies on relators bringing actions under the FCA. Id.
at 3. Further, there is "[t]he risk of a hospital facing disproportional penalties for an innocent Stark
violation, however, is exacerbated to the extent that prosecutorial discretion has been effectively
abdicated to whistleblowers under the qui tam provisions of the FCA." Id. at 11. Additionally, "the
industry has viewed Stark enforcement as akin to lightning striking - unpredictable but deadly." Id.
7. Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Justice, United States Resolves $237
Million False Claims Act Judgment against South Carolina Hospital that Made Illegal Payments to
Referring Physicians (Oct. 16, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/united-states-resolves-237million-false-claims-act-judgment-against-south-carolina-hospital. Tuomey Healthcare System is a
301

bed medical facility located in South Carolina. History, PALMETTO HEALTH TUOMEY,

http://www.tuomey.com/about/history.aspx (last visited Apr. 10, 2017).
8. United States ex rel Drakeford v. Tuomey, 792 F.3d 364, 387, 389-90 (4th Cir. 2015). As
of October 16, 2015, Tuomey entered into a settlement with the DOJ to reduce its civil monetary
penalty to $72.4 million, and will be sold to Palmetto Health, a multi-hospital conglomerate. Press
Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, supra note 7. While the settlement drastically reduced the damages
award, Tuomey's penalty is still a "death sentence" as Judge Wynn noted in his concurring opinion.
Tuomey, 792 F.3d at 390 (Wynn, J., concurring).
9. Tuomey, 792 F.3d at 390. Judge Wynn also stated, "Ironically, the Stark law was actually
intended to simplify life by creating 'bright lines' between what would be permitted and what would
be disallowed, and creating certainty by removing intent from the equation." Id. at 393. Instead,
Stark "has become a booby trap rigged with strict liability and potentially ruinous exposureespecially when coupled with the False Claims Act." Id. at 395. A medically underserved area is
established by the Health Resources and Services Administration ("HRSA"). Medically
Underserved ArealPopulation (MUA/P) Application Process, HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVICES

ADMIN., http://www.hrsa.gov/shortage/mua/imutables.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2017). HRSA
establishes what is a medically underserved area based on four metrics: (1) percentage of the
population below the poverty line; (2) percentage of the population over the age sixty-five; (3) the
infant mortality rate for the area; and (4) the ratio of primary care physicians per 1000 people. Id.
The four individual scores are then tabulated and if the score adds up to less than sixty-two, the area
is deemed medically underserved. Id.
10. What's Medicare?, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/sign-up-change-plans/
(last visited Apr. 10, 2017).
decide-how-to-get-medicare/whats-medicare/what-is-medicare.html
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were an estimated fifty-four million people enrolled in Medicare
programs." Despite the increase in Medicare enrollees since 1990,
the number of inpatient hospital bedsl 2 has decreased by forty-five
percent.13 As part of its initial mandate, CMS stated that Medicare
did not "authorize any Federal officer or employee to exercise any
supervision or control over the practice of medicine or the manner
in which medical services are provided or over the selection, tenure,
or compensation .. . of any institution, agency, or person providing
health services."l 4
Therefore, with fewer and fewer Medicare dedicated beds and
enrollment expected to reach 64.3 million subscribers by 2020," medical
facilities should not be forced to bear heavier regulatory burdens.1 6 The
government has an interest in settling claims faster, in order to receive
penalties and Medicare overpayments in a more timely fashion." A
quicker disclosure process would allow Stark Law to better self-police
the health care industry and expedite large claims that the DOJ has
grown accustomed to collecting as a result of health care entities
entering into self-dealing contracts with physicians."
Over the years, in response to various abuses, Congress has been
forced to legislate against its original mandate to ensure that Medicare
provides its authorized function of supplying necessary health
coverage.' 9 One of these legislative acts was Stark Law.20 Stark Law
Medicare has four distinct parts (Parts A to D). Id. "Part A covers inpatient hospital stays, care in a
skilled nursing facility, hospice care, and some home health care" (hospital coverage). Id. "Part B
covers certain doctors' services, outpatient care, medical supplies, and preventive services"

(medical insurance). Id Part C is "[a] type of Medicare health plan offered by a private company
that contracts with Medicare to provide you with all your Part A and Part B benefits" (Medicare
Advantage plans) and Part D adds prescription drug coverage. Id. (stating that Medicare additionally
covers some younger people with disabilities, and people with End-Stage Renal Disease).
11.

U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 2014 CMS STATISTICS 6 (2014), https://

www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/CMS-StatisticsReference-Booklet/Downloads/CMSStats_2014 final.pdf. Medicare enrollment has increased
183% to 54 million subscribers, up from 1966 when it was only 19.1 million subscribers. Id. at 1.
12. Id. at 2.
13. Id. The number of inpatient beds has decreased from 32.8 beds per 1000 enrolled in 1990
to 18.1 per 1000 in 2013. Id.
14. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 1802, 79 Stat. 291 (1965)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2012)).
15.

Projected Change in Medicare Enrollment, 2000-2050, KAISER FAM. FOUND., http://

kff.org/medicare/slide/projected-change-in-medicare-enrollment-2000-2050 (last visited Apr. 10,
2017).
16. See discussion infra Part W.A.
17. See discussion infra Part W.A.
18. See discussion infra Part W.A.
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2012). In 1972, Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b,
commonly known as the "Anti-Kickback Statute," to prohibit any person or entity from making or
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aims to prevent doctors and health care entities from entering into
agreements where the physician has a financial interest, be it ownership
or a referral-based compensation arrangement.21 Stark Law has taken a
long time from enactment to utilization, going through numerous phases
to mutate from a prohibition placed on doctors referring patients for
blood lab work, to a statute comprised of two pages of definitions and
prohibitions and an additional nine pages of exceptions.2 2
Since 1998, the main avenue for a non-compliant entity to disclose
a Stark Law violation was through the Office of Inspector General's
("OIG") Self-Disclosure Protocol ("SDP").23 In 2010, as part of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA"), Congress
mandated that CMS create its own self-disclosure protocol for Stark Law
violations. 24 The Self-Referral Disclosure Protocol ("SRDP") has been
heavily criticized since its inception in 2010,25 with few disclosures and
even fewer resolutions. 26 In March 2015, five years after its inception,
CMS had only settled sixty-nine self-disclosures through the SRDP and
had a queue of over 300 disclosures. 2 7
accepting payment to induce or reward any person "for referring, recommending, or arranging the

purchase of any item for which payment may be made under a federally-funded health care
program." Id. § 1320a-7b(b)(1)(A); see FederalAnti-Kickback Law and Regulatory Safe Harbors,
OFF. INSPECTOR GEN. (Nov. 1999), https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/safeharborregulations/safefs.htm.
In 1986, Congress expanded the FCA to cover health care entities in an effort to curb false claims
made for reimbursement through Medicare. See H.R. REP. No. 99-660, pt. 1, at 21 (1986) ("[T]he
new definition clearly covers false claims for reimbursement under the Medicare, Medicaid, or
similar programs."). Finally, in 1989, Stark Law was created to prevent physicians from referring
patients for clinical lab services in which they had an ownership interest. About Stark Law, supra
note 2.
20.

About Stark Law, supranote 2.

21. Id. Many people have criticized the practice, alleging "an inherent conflict of interest,
given the physician's position to benefit from the referral." Id. Further, "[t]hey suggest that such
arrangements may encourage over-utilization of services, in turn driving up health care costs." Id.
22.

Patrick A. Sutton, The Stark Law in Retrospect, 20 ANNALS HEALTH L. 15, 23-25, 31

(2011).
23.

Publication of the OIG's Provider Self-Disclosure Protocol, 63 Fed Reg. 58,399, 58,400

(Oct. 23, 1998); see also U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT TO CONGRESS:
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MEDICARE SELF-REFERRAL DISCLOSURE PROTOCOL 3 (2012), https://

www.cms.gov/medicare/fraud-and-abuse/physicianselfreferral/downloads/CMS-SRDP-Report-toCongress.pdf ("The SDP was first displayed in the Federal Register in 1998, after being created out
of a pilot program operated by [the] OIG and DOJ.").
24. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6407, 124 Stat. 772
(2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2012)).
25. Letter from Jim McDermott, Congressman, U.S. House of Representatives, to Marilyn
Tavenner, Adm'r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. (Aug. 13, 2013) (on file with author).
26. See Tony Maida, Disclosure Smart: Strategic Considerations in Making a
Government Disclosure, AHLA WKLY. (Mar. 13, 2015), https://www.mwe.com/-/media/files/

thought-leadership/publications/2015/03/disclose-smart-strategic-considerations-in-makin
ahlaweekly031315/fileattachment/ahlaweekly031315.pdf.
27. Id
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Many exceptions are contained in Stark Law, and they make an
already complex statute even less user-friendly. 28 Health care entities
can easily run afoul of Stark Law and fall vulnerable to heavy civil
penalties. 29 This Note focuses on streamlining the SRDP process to limit
the amount of time health care entities spend waiting for a resolution
from CMS. 30 Further, this Note posits a set of guidelines that CMS can
transmit to ensure entities have a clearer roadmap for utilizing the
SRDP process.3
Part II of this Note offers background information and the moving
parts of Stark Law,3 2 including the SRDP and the various alterations it
has undergone through the years.33 Part III discusses the various
problems facing the SRDP since its inception,34 including the slow pace
of claim settlements,35 the need for a separate disclosure process for
technical and substantive violations,3 6 and the lack of clear penalty
guidelines.37 Part IV provides solutions to these problems, including
speeding up the disclosure process by CMS for processing disclosures
via the SRDP,38 creating a separate disclosure for technical and
substantive disclosures,39 providing clearer guidelines,40 and improving
the way CMS publishes disclosures on its website.4 1
II.

A "STARK" HISTORY

Stark Law began as a way to combat the abuse of doctors referring
patients to clinics for unnecessary tests solely for personal, financial
benefit. 42 Today, it primarily deals with the hospital level and is
complied with through the use of qui tam lawsuits brought by private
citizens.43 Subpart A lays out the creation of Stark Law; the initial statute
and the many implementation phases and alterations it has gone through
28.

See Sutton, supra note 22, at 31 (stating that Stark Law consists of two pages of

provisions and an exhaustive nine pages of exceptions).
29. Id.
30.

See infra Part V.A.

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

See infra Part IV.C.
See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part II.B-D.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part hI.B.
See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part W.A.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.C.1.
See infra Part IV.C.2.

42.

About Stark Law, supra note 2.

43.

Id
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in its more than twenty-five year history.44 Subpart B sets out some basic
definitions necessary to understand the various elements of a Stark Law
violation.45 Subpart C gives a basic overview of the many Stark Law
exceptions.4 6 Finally, Subpart D gives an introduction to the brief history
of the SRDP.47
A.

StarkLaw: "What a Long, Strange Trip It's Been"

Stark Law was originally enacted in 1989 as a response to doctors
referring patients to lab clinics in which the doctors had an ownership
interest. 48 The law's namesake, U.S. Congressman Pete Stark, created
the statute to prevent physician self-referral to a medical facility in
which he or she has a financial interest-whether it be "ownership,
investment, or a structured compensation arrangement." 4 9 The law has
been expanded since its inception to cover a host of designated health
services ("DHS")o that make compliance necessary for a myriad of
health care entities." It is believed that doctors entering into these
referral-based compensation arrangements encourages overutilization of
services, thus increasing the cost of health care.52 Congressman Stark
wanted to promote "self-enforcement" by making a statute that was
clear, with substantial penalties. 53 The statute has undergone many
changes, covering more services and carving out exceptions to others.54
Prior to the enactment of Stark Law, abuses of Medicare were
prosecuted under the "Anti-Kickback Statute,"" and a violating entity
was subject to civil fines and criminal prosecution.s6 Congressman Stark
44.
45.
46.
47.

See
See
See
See

48.

See About Stark Law, supra note 2.

infra Part
infra Part
infra Part
infra Part

49. Id.
50. See 42 C.F.R.
a DHS list).

H.A.
I.B.
I.C.
I.D.

§ 411.351

(2009); see also infra note 76 and accompanying text (providing

51.

About Stark Law, supra note 2.

52.

Id.

53.

See Jennifer A. Hanson, Note, The Academic Medical CenterException to the Stark Law:

Compliance by Teaching Hospitals, 61 ALA. L. REv. 373, 374-75 (2010) (noting that Stark Law
imposes a strict liability standard).
54. See Tironi, supra note 4, at 238 ("Given the highly detailed and technical nature of
the Stark Law exceptions, a seemingly minor oversight, such as neglecting to obtain a party's
signature on an agreement, can trigger disproportionately severe consequences for a physician or
DHS entity. . . .").
55. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2012).
56. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
LAWS AGAINST HEALTH CARE FRAUD RESOURCE GUIDE 2 (2015), https://www.cms.gov/

Medicare-Medicaid-Coordination/Fraud-Prevention/Medicaid-Integrity-Education/Downloads/fwa-
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was upset with the "severe and inflexible intent element of the AntiKickback Statute."s? In pertinent part, the statute prohibits a physician
from referring a patient to a DHS in which the physician, or an
immediate family member, has a financial interest, unless an exception
applies. 5 9 The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 later
expanded Stark Law to include a variety of additional health services
and applied it to Medicare and Medicaid."o In 1997, Stark Law was
revised to allow the Secretary of CMS to issue advisory opinions on
whether a referral relating to a DHS is prohibited by the law."
Next, came what is known as the phases of Stark, starting in
2001 with Phase 1.62 Phase I addresses basic statutory definitions,
general prohibitions, and explanations of what constitutes a financial
relationship between a physician and a health care entity providing
DHS.63 Phase II deals with the regulatory exceptions, reporting
requirements, and public comments pertaining to Phase 1.64 Finally,
Phase III regulations were published in September of 2007 and largely
address comments made after publication of the Phase II regulations.65
Phase III not only creates clarity with additional explanation but also
reduces the regulatory burden imposed on the health care industry by
modifying many of the exceptions related to financial relationships
between physicians and DHS entities where there is little risk of abuse to
the patient or Medicare programs.6 6
Violations of Stark Law can come at a hefty price.67 The statute
provides for the following sanctions on claims submitted for DHS
in violation of Stark: (1) denial of payment; 68 (2) requiring refund of
funds received; 69 (3) civil penalties up to $15,000 per service;70 and
laws-resourceguide.pdf.
57. Hanson, supra note 53, at 374-75. There is a knowledge requirement under the AntiKickback Statute. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1) (2012).
58. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(h)(6)(A)-(L); infra note 77 and accompanying text (listing the
DHSs covered by the statute).
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a)(1)(A).
60. About Stark Law, supra note 2. For the purpose of this Note, Stark Law is examined
primarily from the perspective of how it is applied to Medicare. See supra Part I.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(g)(6)(A); see About StarkLaw, supra note 2.
62. See Sutton, supra note 22, at 24 (explaining that the Stark phases would be revisions to
Stark II).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 25.
66. Id.
67. See infra notes 69-72.
68. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(g)(1) (2012).
69. Id. § 1395nn(g)(2).
70. Id. § 1395nn(g)(3).
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(4) exclusion from Medicare or Medicaid programs, where a physician
or entity knowingly enters into an improper cross-referral arrangement
or scheme in order to avoid the self-referral ban.'
Additionally, a violation of Stark Law can trigger the FCA because
Medicare providers must certify, as a condition precedent to submitting
a claim, that they are in compliance with federal law, including Stark
Law.72 Under the FCA, a claim is false if any person "knowingly
presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for
payment or approval."73 A violation of the FCA carries a penalty of three
times the amount paid by the government and a civil monetary penalty
of between $5000 and $10,000 per claim.74 Most penalties under the
FCA come as a result of qui tam relator suits. 75
B. Definitions and Termsfor Stark Law
The operation of Stark Law rests heavily upon the three definitions
listed below.76 A physician under Stark Law is defined as "a doctor of
medicine or osteopathy, a doctor of dental surgery or dental medicine, a
doctor of podiatric medicine, a doctor of optometry, or a chiropractor." 77
A "referral" is any request, in any form, by a physician for a DHS
for which payment may be made under Medicare Part B; a request
for a consultation with another physician; any test arising out of
that consultation; and the establishment of a plan of care that includes
a DHS.7 1 A "designated health service" is any (1) clinical laboratory
service (covered by the 1989 enactment); (2) physical therapy;
(3) occupational therapy; (4) outpatient speech-language pathology
services; (5) radiology and certain imaging services; (6) radiation
therapy services and supplies; (7) durable medical equipment and
supplies; (8) parenteral and enteral nutrients, equipment, and supplies;
(9) prosthetics, orthotics, and prosthetic devices and supplies; (10) home

§

71.

Id.

72.

Sutton, supra note 22, at 33.

1395nn(g)(4).

73. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (2012).
74. Id. § 3729(a).
75. See Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, supra note 4. Qui tam relator suits have been
the driving force behind FCA enforcement. Id. The number of qui tams has increased since 2009,
especially for violations of Stark Law, with the DOJ collecting over seventeen billion dollars,
comprising nearly half of the total FCA civil penalties paid out since the FCA was amended in
1986. See id
76.

See infra notes 78-89 and accompanying text.

77.
78.

42 C.F.R.
Id.

§ 411.351 (2009).
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health services; (11) outpatient prescription drugs; and (12) inpatient and
outpatient hospital services.79
Additionally, under Stark Law a financial relationship exists
between the physician and the entity if (1) there is an ownership interest;
(2) an investment interest; or (3) a compensation arrangement between
the physician (or an immediate family member) and the entity.so Further,
the regulations state that a financial relationship, with respect to
ownership, investment, or a compensation arrangement may be either
direct or indirect." A financial relationship is direct if "remuneration
passes between the referring physician (or a member of his or her
immediate family) and the entity furnishing DHS without any
intervening persons or entities between the entity furnishing DHS and
the referring physician (or a member of his or her immediate family)."82
A physician is said to have a direct compensation arrangement with an
83
entity if the only intervening entity is his or her physician organization.
Indirect financial relationships are intricate, especially indirect
compensation agreements.84 Under the regulations, an indirect
ownership or investment interest exists if there is an unbroken chain of
owners between the physician and the entity furnishing DHS, and the
entity has actual knowledge (or acts in reckless disregard or deliberate
ignorance) of. the fact that the referring physician has some ownership
or investment interest in the furnishing entity." For an indirect
compensation arrangement, three conditions must be satisfied: (1) there
must be an unbroken chain of persons or entities that have a financial
relationship between the referring physician and the entity furnishing
DHS;86 (2) the referring physician receives aggregate compensation
"that varies with, or takes into account, the volume or value of referrals
or other business generated by the referring physician for the DHS
entity";87 and (3) the DHS entity must have actual knowledge (or act in
reckless disregard or in deliberate ignorance) of the fact that the

79. Id.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a)(2) (2012).
81. 42 C.F.R. § 411.354(a)(1)(i) (2011).
82. Id. § 411.354(a)(2)(i).
83. Physicians' Referrals to Health Care Entities with Which They Have Financial
Relationships, 72 Fed. Reg. 51,012, 51,028 (Sept. 5, 2007) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 411 and
424).
84.

Sutton, supranote 22, at 28.

85. 42 C.F.R. § 411.354(b)(5)(i)(A)-(B).
86. Id. § 411.354(c)(2)(i).
87. Id. § 411.354(c)(2)(ii) (specifying that the physician's compensation correlates to the
amount of business he or she refers to the DHS entity).
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physician's aggregate compensation varies based on the volume or
value of referrals."
C.

"Stark" Exceptions

The various exceptions under Stark Law are divided into three
broad categories: "(1) all-purpose exceptions, which apply to both
ownership and compensation arrangements; (2) ownership and
investment exceptions; and (3) direct and indirect compensation
arrangement exceptions." 89 The regulations that govern the exceptions
require considerable time and energy to analyze issues, such as, whether
physicians in a group practice spend the necessary number of hours with
patients per week providing non-DHS services;9 0 whether the volume of
space rented or leased surpasses the sum "reasonable and necessary" to
qualify as a legitimate business purpose;91 and, lastly, whether any
amount of remuneration92 exceeds "fair market value." 93
As the statute provides, "[t]he general exceptions include: physician
services where referrals are between members of the same group
practice; 94 certain secondary services performed within the same office
of a group practice;95 and certain prepaid health plans, such as [health
maintenance organizations]."9 6 Additionally, for physician groups, the
"in-office ancillary services exception" is the most widely used Stark
Law exception and also one of the most wide-ranging exceptions
available. 97 To qualify for this exception, the physician must belong
to an eligible "group practice" 98 and meet requirements concerning
the supervision of the physician administering services, 99 the
physical location of the building housing the practice as well as its
characteristics,' and how the practice bills."o' If these regulatory
requirements are met, physicians are allowed to provide certain DHS in

§ 411.354(c)(2)(iii).

88.

Id.

89.

Sutton, supra note 22, at 30.

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
physician
100.
101.

See 42 C.F.R. § 411.355(b)(2)(A)(2) (2009); Sutton, supra note 22, at 30.
42 C.F.R. § 411.357(a)(3); see Sutton, supranote 22, at 30.
See 42 C.F.R. § 411.351; Sutton, supra note 22, at 30.
Sutton, supra note 22, at 30; see 42 C.F.R. § 411.357(c)(2)(i).
42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)(1) (2012).
Id. § 1395nn(b)(2).
Sutton, supra note 22, at 30; see § 1395nn(b)(3).
Sutton, supra note 22, at 30.
42 C.F.R. § 411.352 (2009); see Sutton, supranote 22, at 30.
See 42 C.F.R. § 411.355(b)(1) (dealing with the physicians referring a patient to another
through a referral); Sutton, supranote 22, at 30.
42 C.F.R. § 411.355(b)(2); Sutton, supranote 22, at 30.
42 C.F.R. § 411.355(b)(3); Sutton, supranote 22, at 30.
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the group's office without initiating the Stark Law prohibition on
self-referral.1 0 2
Other categories of exceptions pertain to ownership or investment
interests including those interests in publicly traded securities or mutual
funds.' Also, exceptions correspond to ownership and investment
interests in DHS furnished in rural areas.1 04 Another exception pertains
specifically to health care facilities located in Puerto Rico.' And lastly,
an exception relates to ownership and investment interests in hospitals
meeting certain requirements.1 0 6
Finally, there are exceptions for other types of direct and indirect
compensation arrangements, including rental of office space and
equipment,' bona fide employment relationships,'0 8 personal services
arrangements (used when physicians are independent contractors rather
than employees), 1 remuneration unrelated to the provision of DHS,uo
physician recruitment,"' isolated transactions (for example, the one-time
sale of a practice),1 2 group practice arrangements,' 13 and payments by
physicians for certain items and services.114
The many exceptions listed above collectively serve as a major
point of contention in the debate over Stark Law's effectiveness, with
some critics arguing that the exceptions limit the prohibition's efficacy
and provide too many loopholes, which providers can use to avoid Stark
Law by entering into indirect arrangements."' Alternatively, it has been
6
argued that the exceptions make the law too complex to comprehend."
Furthermore, the ACA significantly limits the ability of physicians to
invest in hospital facilities by prohibiting hospitals from increasing the
total percentage of the total value of ownership interests held in a

102. Sutton, supra note 22, at 30-31; see 42 C.F.R. § 411.355(b).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(c) (2012).
104. Id. § 1395nn(d)(2).
105. Id. § 1395nn(d)(1).
106. Id. § 1395nn(d)(3); Sutton, supra note 22, at 31.
107. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(e)(1).
108. Id. § 1395nn(e)(2).
109. Id. § 1395nn(e)(3); see Sutton, supra note 22, at 31.
110. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(e)(4).
111. Id. § 1395nn(e)(5).
112. Id. § 1395nn(e)(6); see Sutton, supra note 22, at 31.
113. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(e)(7).
114. Id. § 1395nn(e)(8).
115. See, e.g., Anne W. Morrison, An Analysis of Anti-Kickback and Self-Referral Law in
Modern Healthcare,21 J. LEGAL MED. 351, 378 (2000); Sutton, supranote 22, at 31.
116. See Morrison, supranote 115; Steven D. Wales, The Stark Law: Boon or Boondoggle? An
Analysis of the Prohibitionon Physician Self-Referrals, 27 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 1, 22-23 (2003).
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hospital by physicians, as well as subjecting physician owners to a
multitude of new requirements.117
D.

Enactment of the Self-Referral DisclosureProtocol: Giving Stark
Its Own Disclosure Protocol

In 2010, through former President Barack Obama's promotion, the
United States enacted the ACA in an effort to ensure that all Americans
have secure access to health care coverage."s As part of the ACA,
Congress directed the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services ("HHS") to develop and implement a disclosure
process for Stark Law violations.1 19 Prior to this, all Stark Law violations
were disclosed through the OIG's SDP. As a result, the HHS and the
CMS created the SRDP to foster the resolution of potential or actual
violations of Stark.120 This Part gives an in depth look at disclosures
prior to SRDP, its enactment, and the important developments in its
brief existence. 12 1
1. Disclosures Prior to the Self-Referral Disclosure Protocol
Prior to the enactment of the SDP and the SRDP, providers "had
the option to make unsolicited or voluntary refunds to Medicare
administrative contractors who process claims and issue payments on
behalf of CMS."1 22 In general, these refunds came in the form of an
adjusted bill or check.1 23 Entities could also request an advisory opinion
from CMS to resolve violations. 124 For CMS to consider an advisory
opinion, the requester must be a party to the existing agreement; the
requestor is the only individual or entity that may rely on that opinion. 125
117. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6001, 124 Stat. 685
(2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2012)).
118. See Cheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, A Stroke of a Pen, Make That 20, and It's
Official, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2010, at A19.
119. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6407, 124 Stat.
772 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn).
120.

U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 23, at 1.

121.

See infra Part II.D.1-2.

122.

U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 23, at 2.

123. Id.
124. See 42 C.F.R. § 411.370(a}-(b) (2010). This has seldom been done. See Advisory
Opinions, CMS.Gov,
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Fraud-and-Abuse/PhysicianSelfReferral/
advisoryopinions.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2017). At the time of the ACA, CMS had only issued
eight advisory opinions. Id.
125. 42 C.F.R. § 411.370(b)(1)-(2); see Advisory Opinions, supra note 124. Advisory opinions
are now considered separately from the SRDP. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra

note 23, at 4-5. Advisory opinions are not retrospective and are a means to inform entities if a
violation may occur or is occurring; it is not a means of resolving an actual or potential Stark Law
violation. Id. at 3.
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Also, starting in 1998, entities could make disclosures through the
OIG under its SDP.1 26 Today, a Stark Law violation may still be
disclosed through the SDP, but only if it is coupled with a violation of
the Anti-Kickback Statute. 12 7 The SDP is available to all health care
providers, whether individuals or entities.' 28 It is intended to facilitate
resolution of matters that, in the provider's reasonable assessment,
potentially violate federal criminal, civil, or administrative laws. 2 9 in
March 2009, the OIG issued an open letter limiting the "scope" of the
SDP.'30 No longer would the OIG accept disclosure of matters that only
involved Stark Law liability.II1
A third path for disclosing a Stark Law violation is through the
DOJ or U.S. Attorney's Office.' 32 The DOJ has the authority to resolve
improper disbursements under common law theories of payment by
mistake or unjust enrichment' 33 and the authority to dismiss providers
from any civil or administrative claim under the FCA.134
2. The Self-Referral Disclosure Protocol
On March 23, 2010, Congress required CMS to add a disclosure
protocol for Stark Law violations as part of the ACA.13 5 CMS enacted
the SRDP in September of that same year. 3 6 Additionally, the Secretary
of HHS was given the discretion to reduce the amount due for all Stark

126. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 23, at 3. This protocol was enacted
in 1998 by the OIG of the HHS to establish a process for providers to voluntarily identify, disclose,
and resolve instances of potential fraud involving federal health care programs (defined by section
1128B(f) of the Social Security Act). As of April 2013, the OIG has received over 800 selfdisclosures and recovered over $280 million for federal health care programs. U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., UPDATED OIG's PROVIDER SELF-DISCLOSURE PROTOCOL 1 (Apr. 17,

2013), http://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/self-disclosure-info/files/provider-self-disclosure-Protocol.pdf
127.

U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 23, at 3. This most commonly

occurs when a health care provider is in violation of both Stark Law and the Anti-Kickback Statute.
Id.
128.

U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 126, at 3 ("The SDP is not limited

to any particular industry, medical specialty, or type of service.").
129. Publication of the OIG's Provider Self-Disclosure Protocol, 63 Fed Reg. 58,399, 58,400
(Oct. 23, 1998).
See Daniel R. Levinson, An Open Letter to Health Care Providers,U.S. DEP'T HEALTH

&

130.

HUM. SERVICES (Mar. 24, 2009), http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/openletters/OpenLetter3-24-09.pdf
131. Id.
132.

U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 23, at 4.

133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6407, 124 Stat. 772
(2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2012)). Congress gave CMS six months to enact a
disclosure protocol. Id.
136. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 126, at 4. The SRDP was placed on
the CMS website. Id.
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Law violations, based on an assessment of the conduct disclosed through
the SRDP.1 37

In evaluating a disclosure under the SRDP, CMS may take into
account (1) the nature and degree of the improper or illegal practice;"'
(2) the timeliness of the self-disclosure;" (3) the cooperation in
40
providing additional information associated with the disclosure;1
41
and (4) any "other factors as the Secretary considers appropriate."l
The ACA also established a deadline for reporting and returning
overpayments if one is received by a health care entity.14 2
A party utilizing the SRDP must submit its disclosure both
electronically and in hard copy.1 4 3 Once the disclosure is received, CMS
sends an automated e-mail response acknowledging the disclosure.'"
The significance of the acknowledgement e-mail is that it temporarily
suspends the disclosing party's obligation under the ACA to return any
overpayments. 14 in order to establish a full disclosure, the party must
submit the following information to CMS:
(1) identifying information of disclosing party; (2) a description of the
nature of the matter being disclosed; (3) duration of violation (look
back period); (4) circumstances under which the matter was discovered
and measures taken to address the issue and prevent future abuses;
(5) a statement identifying a history of similar conduct or enforcement
action; (6) a description of any compliance program; (7) if applicable,
a description of appropriate notices provided to other government
agencies; and (8) whether the matter is under current inquiry by
the government.1 46

In addition, the SRDP requires a party to submit a legal analysis of how
the disclosed matter violated Stark Law, by identifying which elements

137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1128J, 124 Stat. 753
(2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7k (2012)). Entities now have sixty days to
return overpayments, thus placing an impetus on the disclosing party to quickly submit a claim to
the SRDP. Id Entities are now forced to turn around reports within two months, and this is a main
factor contributing to incomplete SRDP disclosures. See Peter J. Eggers, Comment, Disclosurefor
Closure? Why the Self-Referral DisclosureProtocol Process Pairedwith the 60-Day Overpayment
Rule Creates More Headaches Than Solutions, 8 ST. Louis U. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 189, 206
("The 60-day-rule applies pressure to the provider to disclose before ready.").
143. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 23, at 5.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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of any applicable exceptions were and were not satisfied under the
arrangement. 14 7 Disclosing entities must also provide an in depth
financial analysis of the potential amount owed, a description of the
methodology used to determine that amount, the potential amount that
physician(s) received as a result of the actual or potential Stark violation
and the audit activity and documentation used. 148
III.

WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE SELF-REFERRAL
DISCLOSURE PROTOCOL

The SRDP has been criticized by many for its slow pace of
resolving disclosures and CMS's lack of clear guidelines for the
disclosure process as a whole. 14 9 Health care entities lack anything that
would resemble a clear set of guidelines on either of these issues."so
Subpart A discusses how the SRDP has failed to settle disclosures in a
timely fashion as compared to its counterpart at the 01G.151 Next,
Subpart B addresses the lack of a separate disclosure method for
substantive versus technical violations." 2 Finally, Subpart C focuses on
the lack of guidelines for disclosing parties.153
A.

The Self-Referral DisclosureProtocolMoves at a Sloth-Like Pace

A requirement of creating the SRDP was the generation of a report
by CMS. 15 4 In 2010, CMS, in cooperation with HHS, issued a report of
the effectiveness of the SRDP's implementation."' The data was

147. Id.
148. Id. at 6.
149. See Letter from Jim McDermott, Congressman, U.S. House of Representatives, to
Marilyn Tavenner, Adm'r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 25. In 2013,
Congressman Jim McDermott, ranking member of the Ways and Means Subcommittee on Health
and one of the drafters of the SRDP, sent a letter to Marilyn Tavenner, then-Administrator of CMS,
voicing his displeasure with the slow pace of the SRDP process. Id. In his letter, he posits five
suggestions for improving the SRDP process: (1) revising the protocol to include guidance on time
parameters to give disclosing entities some level of certainty; (2) modifying the internal deliberative
process on how monetary penalties are calculated; (3) making the internal deliberative process
public much like the OIG's SDP (referring to the advisory opinion issued by the OIG in 2012); (4)
transferring cases that do not fit within the SRDP out to the DOJ and OIG when there are FCA or
Anti-Kickback violations involved; and (5) punishing entities that fail to provide all the information
required by the SRDP (in effect sending non-compliant entities to the "back of the line"). Id
150. See infra Part III.A-C.
151. See infra Part III.A.
152. See infra Part III.B.
153. See infra Part III.C.
154. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 § 6409, 124 Stat. 772
(2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2012)).
155. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supranote 23, at i.
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collected from September 23, 2010, through March 9, 2012.156 The data
revealed that the 151 submissions submitted to CMS through the SRDP,
encompassed many different categories of violations, and that CMS
settled only six of the disclosures.1 5 1 CMS blamed the low number of
settlements on a myriad of reasons."'
B. Lack of a SeparateDisclosurefor Technical Versus Substantive
Stark Law Violations
Stark Law violations fall under one of two categories-either a
technical or a substantive violation."' A technical violation is one where
the physician and the entity have a contract lacking a signature or have
an otherwise compliant contract that has lapsed.160 These violations
render an otherwise Stark Law compliant contract between a physician
and a health care entity in violation of the Act, "result[ing] in ruinous
liability." 1 61 In today's health care environment, entities maintain
hundreds of contracts, and large health care systems can have thousands,
"making it easy to overlook missing signatures and lapsed
expirations."162 These technical violations can rapidly turn into "milliondollar headaches." 6 3
156. Id. at 8. The data collected shows that during this time 148 various health care entities
(comprised of 125 hospitals, 11 clinical laboratories, 8 physician group practices, 2 community
mental health centers, 1 ambulance services company, and 2 durable medical equipment suppliers)
submitted 150 different claims (two entities submitted multiple claims). Id. at 7-8. Of those 150
submissions CMS had received, only six had been settled at the time of the report. Id. at 8, n.19. Of
the 144 outstanding disclosures, 20 had been placed on administrative hold (for reasons including,
pending bankruptcy proceedings and ongoing law enforcement activities), 61 were awaiting
requested additional information, 3 had been referred to law enforcement for resolution, 51 were
still under CMS review, and 9 were withdrawn by the disclosing party after consultation with CMS.
Id. at 10.
157. See id. at 11. The majority of disclosed violations involved failure to comply with various
Stark Law exceptions including: the personal service arrangements exception (42 C.F.R.
§ 411.357(d) (2009)); the nonmonetary compensation exception (42 C.F.R. § 411.357(k)); the rental
office space exception (42 C.F.R. § 411.357(a)); and the physician recruitment arrangements
exception (42 C.F.R. § 411.357(e)). Id.
158. See id. at 12. Some of those reasons include, the wide variation in the complexity and
number of violations disclosed takes significant time to understand. Id. Also, missing documents
and inadequate legal analysis of claims significantly slows down the agency. Id.
159.

Jean Wright Veilleux, Catching Flies with Vinegar: A Critique of the Centers for

Medicare andMedicaid Self-DisclosureProgram, 22 HEALTH MATRIX 169, 186-87 (2012).
160. See Joe Carlson, Curing Technical Violations: Stark Law Exception Would Let Hospitals
Disclose, Resolve Paperwork Infractions, MOD. HEALTHCARE (June 22, 2013), http://www.

modernhealthcare.com/article/20130622/MAGAZINE/306229970 (stating that other forms of
technical violations exist, but these two are the predominant examples of a technical Stark Law
violation considering the hundreds of contracts maintained by hospitals).
161.

PUB. INTEREST COMM., AM. HEALTH LAWYERS ASS'N, supranote 6, at 6.

162. Carlson, supranote 160.
163. Id.
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In 2007, CMS proposed regulations to remedy failure of Stark Law
to differentiate between substantive and technical violations.1 64 The
proposed regulation would provide a new means for satisfying a Stark
Law exception in the following circumstances:
(1) The facts and circumstances of the arrangement are self-disclosed
by the parties to us; (2) we determine that the arrangement satisfied all
but the prescribed procedural or "form" requirements of the exception
at the time of the referral for DHS at issue and at the time of the claim
for such DHS; (3) the failure to meet all the prescribed criteria of the
exception was inadvertent; (4) the referral for DHS and the claim for
DHS were not made with knowledge that one or more of the
prescribed criteria of the exception were not met (consistent with other
exceptions, we would apply the same knowledge standard as that
applicable under the False Claims Act); (5) the parties have brought (or
will bring as soon as possible) the arrangement into complete
compliance with the prescribed criteria of the exception or have
terminated (or will terminate as soon as possible) the financial
relationship between or among them; (6) the arrangement did not pose
a risk of program or patient abuse; (7) no more than a set amount of
time had passed since the time of the original noncompliance with the
prescribed criteria; and (8) the arrangement at issue is not the subject
of an ongoing Federal investigation or other proceeding (including, but
not limited to, an enforcement matter). 165

This alternative was not to be used where there existed a question of
whether the compensation was of fair market value, related to the
volume or value of referrals, or set in advance.166 Rather, it would only
-be reserved for technical issues resulting from missing signatures or
expired, compliant contracts still being utilized by the parties. 167
Most commenters were in favor of the rule, applauding CMS's goal
of technical violations, while others were skeptical of this approach. 168
The final rule eliminated most of the eight criteria and only pertains to
circumstances in which the providers comply with all Stark Law
obligations other than the signature requirement, and only for a very
short period of time.169 The narrow, final rule made the exception

164. See Medicare Program; Proposed Revisions to Payment Policies Under the Physician Fee
Schedule, and Other Part B Payment Policies for CY 2008, 72 Fed. Reg. 38,122, 38,184-85
(proposed July 12, 2007).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Changes to Disclosure of Physician Ownership in Hospitals and Physician Self-Referral
Rules, 73 Fed. Reg. 48,434, 48,707 (Aug. 19, 2008) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 411.353(g) (2009)).
169. Id.
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irrelevant for most entities.Ie With no exception for missing signatures
and lapse contracts that are unnoticed for years, health care providers
can "potentially rack up huge [Stark Law] and FCA penalties.""
In 2015, CMS only settled forty-nine self-disclosures through the
SRDP 17 2 and had a backlog of over 400 disclosures, some of which had
been waiting over four years for resolution.173 In February of 2015,
Congressman Charles W. Boustany, along with eight co-sponsors,
introduced a bill entitled the Stark Administrative Simplification Act of
2015 ("SASA").17 4 The proposed legislation calls for the implementation
of a separate disclosure protocol for technical violations under Stark
Law. 17 5 It would also include a cap on the civil monetary penalty for
self-disclosed "technical" Stark Law violations. 7
Furthermore, SASA would speed up the disclosure process for
technical violations through the SRDP because under SASA, if an entity
discloses a technical Stark Law violation, CMS then has ninety days to
determine if the disclosure is appropriate.17 7 If CMS does not reject the
disclosure within ninety days, it is deemed accepted.178 This would make
one track for technical violations and another for substantive claims.17 9
This two-track process would be similar to the one that was
recommended by the American Hospital Association ("AHA") in 2010
when CMS was implementing the SRDP.so Under the model proposed
by the AHA, disclosures would fall into one of two categories:
(1) expedited review for technical violations and (2) a detailed review

170. Veilleux, supranote 159, at 190.
17 1. Id.
172. Self-Referral DisclosureProtocolSettlements, CMS.Gov, https://www.cms.gov/medicare/
fraud-and-abuse/physicianselfreferral/self-referral-Disclosure-protocol-settlements.html (last visited
Apr. 10, 2017).
173. Letter from Charles W. Boustany, Jr. & Ron Kind, Congressmen, U.S. House
of Representatives, to Andy Slavit, Adm'r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. (Sept.
21, 2015), http://strategichealthcare.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/092515-Self-Referral-LetterReps.-Boustany-Kind-.pdf
174. Stark Administrative Simplification Act of 2015, H.R. 776, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015).
175. Id.
176. See id (stating that where the violation is disclosed within one year of noncompliance the
fine will not exceed $5000 and where the disclosure is after one year the fine will not exceed
$10,000).
177. See id (stating that CMS may reject any voluntary disclosure within ninety days if it
determines that the disclosure does not conform to the requirements described in the SASA).
178. Id.
179. Letter from Charles W. Boustany, Jr. & Ron Kind, Congressmen, U.S. House of
Representatives, to Andy Slavit, Adm'r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supranote 173.
180. Letter from Rick Pollack, Exec. Vice President, Am. Hosp. Ass'n, to Kathleen Sebelius,
Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. (July 16, 2010), http://www.aha.org/advocacy-issues/
letter/2010/100716-cl-ppaca.pdf.
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for an actual or potential violation.' CMS ultimately did not adopt the
AHA's two-track proposal-most likely because it had previously
rejected a proposal that would afford parties who inadvertently failed to
conform to a procedural requirement the opportunity to "self-correct." 18 2
C.

Lack of Centersfor Medicare and Medicaid Services
Penalty Guidelines

Since its inception, CMS has done little to publicize how it will
settle disclosures made through the SRDP.' 83 Further, the disclosure
statements listed on the CMS website give no indication of how the
agency reached its settlement or the area of the statute that the disclosing
party has violated.' 8 4 In fact the disclosures have gotten shorter over the
past two years, looking like form letters, where CMS simply fills in the
state where the offense occurred, the type of entity disclosing, and the
dollar amount of the final settlement.'
A January 2015 settlement appeared as follows:
Date
Description

2015-01-07
CMS settled a violation of the physician selfreferral law disclosed under the SRDP by a
hospital (the Hospital) located in Minnesota.

On December 22, 2014, CMS settled a violation of the physician selfreferral law disclosed under the SRDP by a hospital (the Hospital)
181. See id. The expedited process would involve circumstances that can be resolved without
significant additional evidence, while the detailed review would require a more involved description
or analysis. Id. Further, the detailed review would be reserved for more complex matters that need a
detailed review by CMS. Id. The AHA identified arrangements with complex payment
methodologies or situations where the extent to which the self-referral law applies is unclear as
good candidates for detailed review. Id. A two-track process would serve both the interests of CMS
and of providers, allowing resources to be allocated efficiently. Id.
182. Veilleux, supranote 159, at 219. In 2008, CMS stated the statute allows a party lacking a
signature, who acts in good faith, to obtain a signature within ninety days and, therefore, is reluctant
to provide an alternative means for curing what could be considered technical violations. Changes to
Disclosure of Physician Ownership in Hospitals and Physician Self-Referral Rules, 73 Fed. Reg.
48,434, 48,707 (Aug. 19, 2008) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 411.353(g) (2009)).
183. Veilleux, supra note 159, at 223. CMS has not publicly disclosed guidelines on its website
or issued any open letters similar to the OIG's procedures. Id.
184. See Self-Referral Disclosure Protocol Settlements, supra note 172. Settlements are listed
in the aggregate amount for the very reason that actual or potential violations of the SRDP are often
confidential information. Id.
185. See, e.g., Detailsfor Title: 2015-01-07, CMS.GOV (Jan. 7, 2015), https://www.cms.gov/
Medicare/Fraud-and-Abuse/PhysicianSelfReferral/Self-Referral-Disclosure-Protocol-SettlementsItems/2015-01-07-mn.html?DLPage=1 &DLEntries=10&DLSort-0&DLSortDir=descendin; Details
for Title: 2013-06-05, CMS.GOV (June 6, 2013), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Fraud-and-Abuse/
PhysicianSelfReferral/Self-Referral-Disclosure-Protocol-Settlements-Items/2013-06-05-Settlement.
html?DLPage=5&DLEntries=10&DLSort-=0&DLSortDir-descending.
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located in Minnesota. The hospital disclosed that it may have
violated the physician self-referral law, because arrangements
with certain physicians failed to satisfy the requirements of an
applicable exception.
The disclosed violation was settled for $231,981."'
This disclosure provides little help to a facility considering whether to
utilize the SRDP."' In at least the first two-and-a-half years, CMS
provided the exception that the entity had violated.' Ironically, this
came at the time when Congressman Jim McDermott was calling for
CMS to publicly release information related to its internal deliberative
process. 1 89 Oddly, at this same time, CMS decided to shorten its
settlement statements to exclude the exception the entity violated.' 90
Another problem faced by a potentially disclosing entity is CMS's
refusal to publicly release any information about how it intends to
resolve disclosures. 19' In 2013, the OIG released an updated version
of the SDP.1 92 At the time of the release, the OIG had already
resolved over 800 disclosures through the SDP.' 93 The OIG saw the

186. Detailsfor Title: 2015-01-07, supra note 185.
187. See supranotes 185-86 and accompanying text.
188. See Details for Title: 2011-02-10, CMS.Gov (Feb. 10, 2011) https://www.cms.gov/
Medicare/Fraud-and-Abuse/PhysicianSelfReferral/Self-Referral-Disclosure-Protocol-SettlementsItems/CMS1249488.html?DLPage=7&DLEntries=10&DLSort-0&DLSortDir-descending. At the
time of its initial disclosure in February 2011, until August 2013, CMS provided the actual
exception that the disclosing entity failed to satisfy. See id. ("The Hospital disclosed under the
SRDP that it violated the physician self-referral statute by (1) failing to satisfy the requirements of
the personal services arrangements exception for arrangements with certain hospital department
chiefs and the medical staff for leadership services, and (2) failing to satisfy the requirements of the
personal services arrangements exception for arrangements with certain physician groups for on-site
overnight coverage for patients at the Hospital.").
189. Letter from Jim McDermott, Congressman, U.S. House of Representatives, to Marilyn
Tavenner, Adm'r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 25. Congressman McDermott
said that this would be "akin" to the steps taken by the OIG to alter its own disclosure protocol. Id.
The OIG amended its SDP to include penalty and time frame guidelines to disclosing entities for
violations of the Anti-Kickback Statute. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 126,

at 2-3, 14.
190. See Detailsfor Title: 2013-06-05, supra note 185 (marking the first time CMS did not
disclose the requirements of the exception the disclosing entity failed to satisfy).
191. See Veilleux, supra note 159, at 223.
192.

See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 126. The revised protocol arose

from the OIG's notice for comments in June 2012. Solicitation of Information and
Recommendations for Revising OIG's Provider Self-Disclosure Protocol, 77 Fed. Reg. 36,281,
36,281 (June 18, 2012).
193. Solicitation of Information and Recommendations for Revising OIG's Provider SelfDisclosure Protocol, 77 Fed. Reg. at 36,281. This represented the number of disclosures by the SDP
from October 1998 through the updated SDP release in April 2013 (an average of fifty-three
resolutions per year). U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 126, at 1.
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opportunity to provide simple, yet straightforward guidelines for entities
considering disclosure. 19 4
As part of the updated SDP, the OIG listed a number of guidelines
it had used and would use going forward for potential violations of the
Anti-Kickback Statute. 9 ' Generally, the OIG stated it will apply a 1.5
damages multiplier to disclosing parties. 196 Also, the OIG has given
entities a clear picture of what it will require of a disclosing entity. 197
Further, a disclosing party must state what section of the Anti-Kickback
Statute it has violated."' Also, a disclosing entity utilizing the SDP must
certify that its internal investigation is complete within ninety days of its
submission.1 99 Further, the OIG will advocate to the DOJ on behalf of a
disclosing party.200 Finally, the OIG has set a minimum monetary
penalty for a disclosing party. 201
IV.

CHANGES TO THE SELF-REFERRAL DISCLOSURE PROTOCOL TO
PROMOTE MORE DISCLOSURES, SPEED-UP THE PROCESS,
AND AVOID THE MADNESS

There are currently many disincentives to disclosing under the
SRDP.202 A health care entity may choose to "roll the dice" and risk
discovery through investigation, prosecution, or a qui tam suit. 20 3
194.

See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supranote 126, at 1.

195. See id. at 3-15 ("This section explains the eligibility criteria for the SDP, including who
may use the SDP and what conduct is and is not eligible for acceptance into the SDP.").
196. Id. at 2. The OIG states that settlement matters will require a minimum multiplier of 1.5
times the single damages (based on what is actually paid to the entity and not what is actually

billed), although, they may determine whether a higher multiplier is warranted. Id.
197.

Laurence Freedman, 10 Things to Know About OIG's Self-Disclosure Protocol, LAw360

(May 2, 2013, 12:23 PM), http://www.1aw360.com/articles/437385/10-things-to-know-about-oig-sself-disclosure-protocol.
198.

See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 126, at 3-4.

199. Freedman, supra note 197. A disclosing entity may ask for an extension if a matter is
overly complex or for other reasonable circumstances. Id.
200. See id. ("[T]he OIG states that in coordinating with the DOJ in both civil and criminal
matters, it will 'advocate' that disclosing parties should receive a benefit from disclosing under the
SDP.").
201. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 126, at 14. Also, the updated SDP
provides that for all other matters the minimum settlement amount will be $10,000. See Freedman,
supra note 197.

202. See supra Part.ILI.A-C.
203. Veilleux, supranote 159, at 201. Reasons for avoidance include as follows:
(1) the difficulty in identifying an overpayment as required in the protocol, (2) CMS's
resistance to settling claims for less than two times the overpayment involved, (3)
CMS's failure to distinguish between procedural [technical] and substantive violations,
(4) the short amount of time within which a disclosure must be made, (5) the difficulty in
determining whether disclosure should be to CMS or another agency, (6) the length of
the "look-back" period, (7) the waiver of attorney-client privilege, (8) the required
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Changes can be made to speed up the SRDP process to eliminate many
of the over 400 disclosures awaiting resolution, as well as create an
incentive for entities to come forward when the Stark Law violation is
merely technical.204 The SRDP process and backlog can be greatly
reduced by creating separate channels for technical and substantive
violations of Stark Law.205 One way to encourage disclosure is to
establish clear guidelines for disclosing entities utilizing the SRDP. 206
Further, CMS must improve its reporting of disclosures, via the SRDP,
on its website.2 07
A.

No More Long Lines (Faster)

The OIG has maintained a commitment to keeping the time of
claim settlement to less than one year.208 Currently, there are many
SRDP disclosures that have been in various stages of the process for
over four years. 2 09 Additionally, legislation has been proposed that
would eliminate some of the lesser "technical violations." 2 10 CMS must

commit to streamlining its process in order to settle claims, so that
disclosing entities are not held in a virtual limbo.2 1 1
When the OIG revamped its disclosure process in 2013, it made a
commitment to settling claims in under twelve months.212 This sped-up
process has a two-fold benefit: (1) the entity has the benefit of
resolution, of knowing what its punishment for violating Stark Law will
entail; 213 and (2) the government gets its remuneration fasteralleviating the backlog of unsettled disclosures that the CMS currently
has.2 14 In its updated SDP, the OIG has stated that "[a]s part of this
commitment, we streamlined our internal process to reduce the average
time a case is pending with OIG to less than 12 months from acceptance

statement about past conduct, (9) the lack of appeal rights, and (10) implications for the
provider's compliance plan.
Id. at 201-02.
204. See infra Part IV.A-B.
205. See infra Part IV.B.
206. See infra Part IV.C.
207. See infra Part IV.C.2.
208.

U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supranote 126, at 3.

209. Letter from Charles W. Boustany, Jr. & Ron Kind, Congressmen, U.S. House of
Representatives, to Andy Slavit, Adm'r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 173.
210. See supranotes 175-79 and accompanying text.
211. See supranotes 172-73 and accompanying text.
212.

U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supranote 126, at 3.

213. See Letter from Charles W. Boustany, Jr. & Ron Kind, Congressmen, U.S. House of
Representatives, to Andy Slavit, Adm'r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supranote 173.
214. Id.
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into the SDP." 2 15 Further, the OIG has stated that it has sped up its
process for submission of its own internal findings, from ninety days
from the date of concluding its internal investigation, to ninety days
from the date of submission. 216 By adopting a faster internal process
similar to that of the OIG, CMS can effectuate faster outcomes giving
resolution to health care entities and also can collect fines and
overpayments on a timelier schedule.2 17
B. Self-Referral DisclosureProtocol Two-Step: CreatingSeparate
Modes ofDisclosurefor Technical and Substantive
Violations (Stronger)
In his 2010 letter, Rick Pollack of the AHA asked CMS to create a
two-track process for disclosing parties utilizing the SRDP. 2 18 Track one
would entail an "expedited review" and be reserved for admissions not
necessitating further disclosure of material facts. 2 19 The second track
would service disclosures resulting from an actual or potential violation
of Stark and require a "detailed review." 2 20 A separate track for deeper
review into a possible substantive review would enable CMS to deal
with entities that have violated the spirit of what Stark aims at
combatting-physician referrals that are generated from volume based
compensation and non-compliant ownership interests in referring
entities. 22 1 The CMS refrained from separating technical and substantive
violations, instead opting to keep all claims on a one-track system,
which has greatly resulted in the stagnation of claims that exists today.222
By creating a separate disclosure method for technical violations
CMS could decrease the amount of time claims spend waiting for
resolution.2 23 In September 2015, Congressmen Charles Boustany and
Ron Kind introduced legislation to the SASA committee. 2 24 This
legislation proposes to have a set deadline of ninety days and to have a

215.

U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 126, at 3.

216. Id.
217. See supra notes 208-16 and accompanying text.
218. Letter from Rick Pollack, Exec. Vice President, Am. Hosp. Ass'n, to Kathleen Sebelius,
Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., supra note 180.
219. Id. Here, entities could easily prove that they have committed a technical violation and
that there is no need for further review. Id

220.
221.
222.
223.
Sebelius,
224.

Id. at 3.
See id
See supra notes 173-77 and accompanying text.
See Letter from Rick Pollack, Exec. Vice President, Am. Hosp. Ass'n, to Kathleen
Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., supra note 180.
Stark Administrative Simplification Act of2015, H.R. 776, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015).
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fixed penalty for technical violations of Stark Law.225 Once an entity has
disclosed a technical violation, CMS would then have ninety days to
determine if the violation is in fact a technical violation, and if CMS
fails to respond within the ninety-day window, the disclosure would be
deemed accepted.226 Accepted disclosures would be subject to a $5000
penalty if the disclosure occurs within one year of the initial date of noncompliance and subject to a $10,000 fine where the disclosure is after
one year.227
C. EstablishingPenalty Guidelines andProvidingBetter Information
to PartiesDisclosing via Self-Referral DisclosureProtocol (Clearer)
Unlike its counter-part in the OIG, CMS has declined to provide
clear guidelines for how it arrives at its penalty determinations and for
how it arrives at its settlements with entities utilizing the SRDP. 228
Along with providing a timeline, the OIG has given disclosing entities
insight into how it will arrive at the penalties for disclosing entities that
violate the Anti-Kickback Statute. 229 Further, CMS has failed to provide
an adequate reporting of how it has arrived at the settlements it has made
with disclosing entities to date on its website.230 Establishing a set of
guidelines will give disclosing entities an awareness of how much
utilizing the SRDP could stand to cost.231 Additionally, improving the
way CMS records settlements on its website will enable a disclosing
entity to know how much it will be penalized, by seeing what penalties
those entities that have already settled have paid.232
1. Providing Clear Penalty Guidelines
Penalties under the SDP have a baseline penalty multiplier of 1.5.233
The OIG has specifically stated that their "general practice . .. is to
require a minimum multiplier of 1.5 times the single damages, although
[they] determine in each individual case whether a higher multiplier may
be warranted." 234 The OIG maintains that it may adjust this number
based on the severity of the disclosure. 23 5 However, this provides
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id
228. See supra Part II.C.
229. See supra Part 11I.C.
230.

See Self-Referral DisclosureProtocolSettlements, supranote 172.

231.
232.

See infra Part IV.C.i.
See infra Part IV.C.2.

233.

U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 126, at 2.

234. Id.
235. Id. at 2, 14 ("As a general practice .... OIG applies this multiplier to the amount paid by
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disclosing entities with some measure of certainty, knowing the penalties
it may face when disclosing a violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute.236
In 2013, when the OIG released the updated SDP, it had already settled
over 800 disclosures since its origination in 1998.237 CMS has the
opportunity to learn from the data that the OIG has compiled in the
seventeen plus years that it has been accepting disclosures (eleven of
which they accepted Stark Law disclosures).238
2. Reformatting the Display of Settled Disclosures on the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Website
CMS has settled a number of disclosures through the SRDP and all
of them can be viewed on its website. 239 Those that are displayed
provide little information for an entity contemplating utilization of the
SRDP. 240 This information, along with the above-mentioned guidelines,
would provide an entity considering the SRDP with even more
information to determine what settlement it may hope to achieve through
the process.24 1
First, in adopting a two-track process, CMS should divide the listed
disclosures into two categories; one for settled technical disclosures and
one for settled substantive disclosures.242 This would allow a disclosing
entity to eliminate any disclosures not pertaining to substantive or actual
Stark violations. 243 Next, in addition to the existing chart, CMS should
list the number of violations that the disclosing entity has divulged
through the SRDP and the penalty amount settled upon by CMS and the
party. 24 By providing this information, subsequent disclosing entities
can better determine how CMS arrived at the penalty through simple
arithmetic. Hence, if there are similar circumstances between the already
settled entity and the one considering the SRDP, the considering entity
can better determine what penalties it may incur. 245
Federal health care programs, not the amount claimed.").
236. See id. at 2.
237. Id. at 1. These 800 disclosures represent over $280 million recovered for federal health
care programs. Id.
238. See supra Part II.D. 1.
239.
240.

Self-Referral DisclosureProtocol Settlements, supra note 172.
See supra note 187 and accompanying text.

241.

See supra Part IV.C.1.

242.

See supra notes 219-23 and accompanying text.

243. See Letter from Rick Pollack, Exec. Vice President, Am. Hosp. Ass'n, to Kathleen
Sebelius, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., supranote 180.
244.

See Self-Referral DisclosureProtocolSettlements, supra note 172.

245. See id. In providing these numbers, entities can formulate a game plan for how to proceed
with a disclosure. See id. They can confer with counsel and also this could speed up the entities own
deliberative process, thus effectuating more thorough and timely disclosures. See id.
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Information that may be pertinent would include the type of Stark
Law violation that the entity had violated.2 4 6 This should include if the
violation was substantive or technical.247 Coupled with the abovementioned two-track process, the entity could better find settlements
on the CMS website that have Stark Law violations that are similar
in scope.2 48
V.

CONCLUSION

No health care entity should face a $237 million fine.2 49 As the
number of qui tam suits increases, health care entities are becoming
more and more exposed to FCA suits as a result of having Stark
noncompliant contracts with physicians. 25 0 The government has taken
strides to create the avenues to self-disclose Stark Law violations.251
However, these steps have not done enough to alleviate an entities'
exposure to harsh penalties.252
CMS needs to publish clear guidelines that give disclosing entities
the information necessary to assess the SRDP process.253 Adopting
guidelines similar to the OIG would give disclosing entities an idea of
the penalties they may face ahead of making a disclosure.25 4 CMS also
should streamline its process, like that of the OIG, to ensure that claims
do not languish in the disclosure process for years. 255 Further, CMS
should adopt different procedures for disclosing parties based on
whether there is a technical or a substantive violation in order to add
expediency in claim processing and to better serve the spirit of why
Stark was created in the first place.256
246. See Letter from Rick Pollack, Exec. Vice President, Am. Hosp. Ass'n, to Kathleen
Sebelius, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., supra note 180.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
251. See supra Part II.D.2.
252. See Letter from Charles W. Boustany, Jr. & Ron Kind, Congressmen, U.S. House of
Representatives, to Andy Slavit, Adm'r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 173
("[W]e are concerned about the disproportionate nature of the penalties providers face when
disclosing technical violations of [Stark Law] and the amount of time it takes for CMS to resolve a
disclosure under the Self-Referral Disclosure Protocol.").
253. SeesupraPartIV.
254. See supra Part IV.C.
255. See Letter from Jim McDermott, Congressman, U.S. House of Representatives, to
Marilyn Tavenner, Adm'r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 25; see also Letter
from Charles W. Boustany, Jr. & Ron Kind, Congressmen, U.S. House of Representatives, to Andy
Slavit, Adm'r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supranote 173 (stating that, as of 2015, many
disclosures had been awaiting resolution for over four years).
256. See supra Part IV.B.
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The government has legislated to protect Medicare and shield it
from people that would attempt to pillage the public coffers. 2 5 7 However,
in the new regime of public health care, it should also strive to ensure
that there is a level playing field.258 Stark Law was created in an effort to
protect Medicare and the public from abuse of physician referrals, but it
was also seen as a means of self-policing by the industry as a whole.2 59
By implementing the above measures, CMS can avoid the madnessensuring compliance and giving entities a better means of disclosing
violations and providing future compliance industry-wide.26 0
Sean Hanssler*

257. See supranote 19 and accompanying text.
258.

See supranote 17 and accompanying text.

259. See supranotes 19-22 and accompanying text.
260.

See supraPart IV.
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